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ACCELERATED EDUCATION AS A REMEDY
FOR ffiGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS
William H. Clune•
High-poverty schools, and the students who attend them, have historically
faced substantial challenges in providing, and receiving, adequate
education. Despite some relief from the courts, school finance remedies
that require the redistribution of monetary aid to low-wealth districts
have encountered strong political opposition. In this Article, Professor
Clune makes a renewed claim for accelerated education as the primary
focus of adequacy litigation in school reform cases. He describes the
nation's educational condition, in which there exists a disturbing correlation between poverty and low educational outcomes. He then drafts a
vision of a comprehensive, school reform remedy, one that emphasizes
institutional success over accountability, and discusses how this remedy
compensates for the inadequacies of reforms suggested by other commentators. Finally, Professor Clune concludes that adequacy theory uniquely
responds to the needs of high-poverty schools and provides the guidance
necessary to achieving better education.

INTRODUCTION: THE PRIORITY OF POOR
CHILDREN IN ADEQUACY LITIGATION

Logically, the poor should be a principal beneficiary of adequacy litigation. Adequacy refers to resources which are sufficient (or adequate) to achieve minimum outcomes and should
be distinguished from equity, which requires equal resources
regardless ofresults. Any theory focused on minimum outcomes
could hardly overlook the strong correlation between poverty
and substandard educational outcomes. 1 As pointed out by Dean
Underwood, a sense of vertical equity-the special needs of
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1. Robert Berne, Educational Input and Outcome Inequities in New York State, in
OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 1, 20-21 (Robert Berne & Lawrence 0. Picus eds.,
1994); Gary Natriello, Four Perspectives on the Disparities Between the Educational
Resources Available to Students'in the Hartford Public Schools and Other Connecticut
Communities 5-7, figs. 1-7 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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various students in meeting minimum standards-pervades
adequacy cases. 2 Courts have spoken eloquently about the dire
consequences of allowing a large segment of American society
to slip into permanent educational decline. 3 Extra resources
certainly seem relevant. Books have been written about the
abysmal condition of many schools in low income areas. 4 Any
teacher could likely speak to the unavailability of the additional
time required to meet the unique educational needs of economically poor children and their families. Indeed, courts have
begun to fashion compensatory remedies. For example, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has ordered extra funding, 5 the
Alabama judiciary has included social services,6 and the State
of Kentucky has begun searching for programs that effectively
provide accelerated education. 7
Even with such new remedies, these are perilous times for
poor children. School finance remedies which redistribute aid to
high-poverty districts typically encounter fierce political resistance and controversy. 8 Contemporary conservative political
thought makes two powerful, though logically redundant, criticisms of compensatory aid-that poor minority children cannot
reach minimum standards9 and that public schools do not

2.
Julie K Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 493, 495-96, 516-17 (1995).
3.
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209-13 (Ky.
1989) (declaring that "every child" in Kentucky, whether rich or poor, must be provided
with a constitutionally adequate educational opportunity); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d
359, 397-99, 411-12 (N.J. 1990) (describing the inadequate facilities and low achievement statistics of certain poor, urban school districts in New Jersey, in sharp contrast
to the resources and educational results of that state's richer, suburban districts).
4.
See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991) (discussing conditions ~hat make academic achievement difficult or
impossible in America's poor and segregated schools).
5.
Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408-10.
6.
Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The
Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 559, 598 (1995). For a brief introduction to
and discussion of accelerated education, see generally HENRY M. LEVIN, CENTER FOR
POL'y RESEARCH IN EDUC., ACCELERATED SCHOOLS FOR AT-RlsK STUDENTS (1988), which
discusses accelerated education as a means of raising the academic performance of
"educationally disadvantaged or at-risk students."
7.
C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in
Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 599, 646-48 (1995).
8.
Margaret E. Goertz, School Finance Reform in New Jersey: The Saga Contin·
ues, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 346, 349-50, 363 (1993).
9.
For a discussion of such politically conservative criticisms, see RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). The Bell Curve is not clear on how much poor
children can learn. Chapter 17 cites some examples of successful remedial education but
claims that further research is needed and that implementation on a wide scale would
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always use extra resources in an efficient manner. 10 School
choice is much touted as a remedy for poor families, 11 but
decentralization has a "dark side" as it easily could be used in
the service of anti-tax forces to slash educational spending for
the poor without improving schools or raising achievement. 12
Meanwhile, partly to secure political consensus, adequacy cases
themselves may focus on equal funding and statewide reform as
remedies, thereby overlooking the more intense and politically
awkward claims of society's most disadvantaged.
This Article is intended to remind us of the case for including
accelerated education 13 as the primary focus of adequacy litiga-

be too expensive. See id. at 415. Chapter 18 notes improved achievement throughout
the 20th century but also includes this enigmatic call for "realism":
[c)ritics of American education must come to terms with the reality that in a universal education system, many students will not reach the level of education that
most people view as basic. Consider again the example of functional illiteracy mentioned earlier: that over 20 percent of 17 year olds are ... marginal readers or
worse. This is usually considered a failure of American education, and perhaps it
is. But most of these nonreaders come from the bottom of the cognitive ability distribution. How well should they be able to read after a proper education, given the
economic, technological, and political constraints on any system of mass education?

Id. at 436.
10. See, e.g., Eric A Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good
Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991) (suggesting that there exists "significant
inefficiency in the operation of schools").
11. See, e.g., George A Mitchell, The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, WIS.
POL'y RES. INST. REP., Nov. 1992, at 1, 4 ("[o)ne proposal [to improve education) is to
give low and moderate income parents more choice in selecting the schools for their
children"); see also John E. Chubb, Political Institutions and School Organization, in
1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 227, 234 (William H. Clune & John
F. Witte eds., 1990) ("Far from being antithetical to school communities, market institutions may provide the only methods of school control that permit communities to
flourish.").
12. See Donald R. Moore, Voice and Choice in Chicago, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 153, 155-56 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990);
Martin Carnoy, Is School Privatization the Answer?: Data From the Experience of Other
Countries Suggest Not, EDUC. WK., July 12, 1995, at 52, 52; JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM
BUREAUCRACY: AMBIGUITIES IN PruvATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (forthcoming Apr.
1996) (manuscript at 257, 329-30, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform). Decentralized school systems ironically may become highly bureaucratized
as a way to survive in a regulated market. See Henry M. Levin, The Theory of Choice
Applied to Education, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 24 7, 276-80
(William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); Chubb, supra note 11, at 232-34.
13.
By "accelerated education," I mean programs designed to bring disadvantaged
students up to grade while they are still in grade school. For a discussion of the need
for such programs, see generally Henry M. Levin, Financing the Education of At-Risk
Students, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALY8IS 47 (1989) [hereinafter Levin,
Financing Education), which analyzes the educational needs of at-risk students and
determines the financial requirements for funding accelerated education. See also Henry
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tion and to recommend remedial strategies which are realistic
yet responsive to the complexities and challenges of the task.
Modern adequacy cases occupy an intermediate position between the old equity theory and the "true adequacy" approach. 14
The rest of this Article is an effort to point toward the direction
of true educational adequacy for economically poor children.
Part I discusses the factual predicate under an adequacy
theory for a special remedy aimed at high-poverty schools. Such
schools have the great preponderance of students who fail to
meet minimum state standards of student achievement and
other key educational outcomes. Part II expands the factual
picture and suggests the scope of an adequate remedy by means
of a brief discussion of the multiple obstacles faced by highpoverty schools in delivering quality education. Part III sets out
the basic architecture of a comprehensive remedy, a remedy
with three parts. Part III.A recommends an "inquiry process"-a set of research studies on locally idiosyncratic conditions, such as the need for new physical facilities and further
development of school-linked social services. Part III.B covers
the heart of the remedy-additional resources and accountability mechanisms-and recommends a compensatory aid grant for
each poor student built on a statewide foundation of fiscal
equity, strongly favoring accountability for results rather than
detailed regulation of school inputs. Part III.C considers what
governance structures are most compatible with the recommended approach to accountability. Both local control and
statewide reform are judged insufficient and, while family
choice might be a useful element, the most congruent form of
governance seems to be some kind of "bilateral contracting"
between agencies of school improvement and each school.
Finally, despite the emphasis on accountability, this Article
concludes that "success is better than accountability." Success,
first established in ambitious educational experiments, can
yield information about how to be successful on a wider scale
and satisfy strong political objections about increased educational spending on poor children.

M. Levin, Accelerated Schools for Disadvantaged Students, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Mar.
1987, at 19 [hereinafter Levin, Accelerated Schools] (discussing methods of improving
the educational plight of disadvantaged students).
·
14.
For a definition and analysis of equity theory, adequacy theory, and true
adequacy, see generally William H. Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School
Finance, 8 EDUC. POL'y 376 (1994), which describes the evolution oflitigation strategies
used to reform inadequate school finance structures.
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I. WHETHER AND FOR WHOM TO ORDER COMPENSATORY AID

The basis and proof for courts ordering some kind of compensatory aid are actually fairly clear. In every state, high-poverty
schools contain large numbers of students who achieve scores
below state-defined minimums on any measure of schooling
outcomes, 15 especially achievement tests and educational attainment.16 Outcomes for such children show massive deficits. For
example, the passing rates of children in high-poverty schools
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York are far below the
statewide averages. 17 In New York, the incidence of low
educational indicators in these schools is truly remarkabl~conomically disadvantaged children and those children
from racial and ethnic minorities are all concentrated in highpoverty/high-minority schools in New York City and other large
cities. 18 Therefore, if adequacy refers to minimum outcomes,
children in high-poverty schools represent the most serious
breach of the adequacy standard.

15. See, e.g., WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION OF THE
CHAPTER 220 PROGRAM 38 (1994) (noting that more than twice as many suburban
students scored above the national fiftieth percentile on the tenth-grade reading test
when compared to the number of urban students scoring at the same level, in a study
of the public schools in Milwaukee and surrounding suburbs).
16. "Educational attainment" means the highest grade level a student reaches
before dropping out.
17.
See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) (ruling on school adequacy
in New Jersey); Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3, 17-20 (analyzing public education in New
York); Natriello, supra note 1, at figs. 3-7 (studying schoolchildren in Connecticut).
18.
One commentator has noted:
The statewide distribution of children from poor families is also striking.... Using
the New York State Department of Education's definition of high poverty-schools
with over 41% of pupils in poverty--45% of pupils in New York City are in high
poverty schools, as are 74% of pupils in the other large city school districts,
compared to 24% statewide.
High poverty-high minority schools are an urban phenomenon in New York
State, where there are 495 such schools. A high poverty school has over 41% of its
pupils in poverty, and in a high minority school over 80% of its pupils are from
racial-ethnic minority groups. There are 427,417 students in these high povertyhigh minority schools and 392,069 are in the 418 high poverty-high minority
schools in New York City.
Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3. The same study shows 55-60% passing rate on the New
York State Regents Comprehensive Examination in English for pupils in low-poverty
schools in suburban and rural districts, compared with a 0-7% passing rate in highpoverty schools, regardless of location. See id. at 20.
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On the finance side, the schools attended by such economically disadvantaged children usually spend near or below the
state average in dollars per pupil. 19 Thus, a natural experiment
has occurred in which two sets of schools-high-poverty schools
and other schools throughout the state-receive about the same
amount of money. One set-the high-poverty schools-achieves
outcomes below the adequacy standard, while the other set
generally passes minimum standards. Apparently, equal dollars
does not produce equal outcomes.

II. THE MULTIPLE PROBLEMS OF HIGH-POVERTY
SCHOOLS AND THE CORRESPONDING NEED
FOR MULTIFACETED REMEDIES

At least with regard to acceptable minimum levels of achievement, such as basic literacy, numeracy, and problem solving,
the idea that there exists an absolute barrier to achievement
seems wrong. We have many examples of successful remedial
programs on a small scale. 20 Rather, the efficiency objection
seems closer to the mark. 21 It seems our educational system has
not been successful at replicating these smaller effective programs on a larger scale.
But the concept of inefficiency, with its connotation of an
uncaring, public school bureaucracy, is so oversimplified as to
be blatantly misleading. We do not understand nearly enough

19. See, e.g., id. at 2-3, 7-8 (providing data relating to high-poverty schools and
per pupil expenditures in New York).
20.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Fennema et al., Learning Mathematics With Understanding:
Cognitively Guided Instruction, in 1 ADVANCES IN RES. ON TEACHING 195, 203-16 (1989)
(proposing a new model for curriculum development); Nancy A. Madden et al., Success
for All: Longitudinal Effects of a Restructuring Program for Inner-City Elementary
Schools, 30 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 123, 127-45 (1993) [hereinafter Madden, Longitudinal
Effects) (describing and evaluating the Success for All reading program); Nancy A.
Madden et al., Success for All, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 593, 594-97 (1991) [hereinafter
Madden, Success for Alli (describing and evaluating the Success for All reading
program).
21.
Cf William S. Barnett, Obstacles and Opportunities: Some Simple Economics
of School Finance Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'¥ 436 (1994) (discussing potential opportunities,
problems, and issues raised by growth in education expenditures); Eric A. Hanushek,
A Jaundiced View of •Adequacy" in School Finance Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'¥ 460, 464
(1994) (concluding that "[t)here is no consistent relationship between the resources
applied to schools and student performance") (emphasis omitted).
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about why education is so difficult in high-poverty schools. 22
Since the problems themselves are not specifically understood,
it is inevitable that there are few standards by which to measure an effective remedy. To put it in terms of the Article by
Morgan, Cohen, and Hershkoff in this Symposium, 23 we have
standards for what a typical good school looks like, but such
standards are only a partial model for what is needed in highpoverty schools. 24 School standards for the typical school do not
embrace the full range of educational services needed in highpoverty schools-services such as accelerated instruction and
better attendance policies-and otherwise do not address how
to achieve standards of good practice in a difficult environment,
one lacking sufficient family involvement in the educational
process, safe schools, and a stable, qualified teaching staff.
Surprisingly, there has been little serious effort to sketch the
educational process and resulting costs of an effective highpoverty school. A substantial knowledge gap exists, but we
know enough that courts could guide the design of a basic
remedy with the capacity for adjustment in light of further
research and the knowledge generated by evaluation of the
reform effort itself. There thus exists a need for a new generation of adequacy cases that assess the problems of high-poverty schools against reasonable standards and attempt to build
· effective remedies. The following discussion describes some of
the problems associated with high-poverty schools in order to
lay the groundwork for the discussion in Part III of how judicial
remedies couid offer viable solutions to these problems.

• High mobility of teachers. At least some high-poverty
schools have extraordinarily high rates of teacher mobility.
One source reports that the average tenure of a teacher in
disfavored high-poverty schools in New York City is approximately six weeks. 25 As a result, there exists an absence of
stability in educational planning and the presence of many
inexperienced, substitute, and uncertified teachers, or

22. See William S. Barnett, Economics of School Reform: What Can We Learn
From Three Promising Models 2-4, 36, 37-38 (Mar. 21, 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (existing research tells
us what effective schools do but little about their processes, costs, and generalizability).
23.
Morgan et al., supra note 7.
24. See id. at 563, 590-91.
25.
Linda Darling-Hammond, Address at Incentives Forum (Dec. 20, 1994).
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teachers who are instructing topics that are not in their field
of specialty. 26

• High mobility of students. Students in high-poverty schools
also have a high rate of.mobility. Furthermore, many students may only attend school intermittently during the short
time that they are enrolled in a school. As a result, there is
an inconsistent and unpredictable pattern of episodic attendance which defies efforts of schools and teachers to provide
a rational, continuous program of instruction.
•Non-accelerated instructional programs. The consequences
of falling behind grade-level in achievement are· devastating,
resulting in a greatly increased probability of dropping out of
high school. 27 Yet few high-poverty schools are effectively
organized to bring children rapidly back to grade-level. Indeed, many educational practices, such as pull-out instruction28 and retention in grade, are counter-productive. 29
• Unsafe and disorderly schools. Learning requires effective
time spent on tasks, which is unavailable in dangerous, disorderly schools. 30 Urban schools face severe disruption from
their external and internal environments and, thus, must
expend extra effort and resources to stabilize the school environment for students and teachers alike.
• Insufficient and inadequate physical facilities and instructional materials. Many urban schools are overcrowded and
lack the instructional facilities necessary to meet state in-

26.
See Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3, 17-20.
27.
See Levin, Financing Education, supra note 13, at 47.
28.
A pull-out program removes the student from the regular classroom for supplementary instruction. Pull-outs have been favored by schools as a means of meeting fiscal auditing requirements but have been criticized on educational grounds
because of lack of coordination with regular instruction. See Kenneth K. Wong, The
Changing Politics ofFederal Educational Policy and Resource Allocation, in RETHINKING
POLICY FOR AT-RISK STUDENTS 25, 39-41 (Kenneth K. Wong & Margaret C. Wang
eds., 1994).
29.
See generally FLUNKING GRADES: RESEARCH AND POLICIES ON RETENTION
(Lorrie A. Shepard & Mary L. Smith eds., 1989) (presenting research on the effects of
grade retention and broadly concluding that it is not an effective policy).
30.
See Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83
ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 427, 445 (1983) (stating that "[c]ommon sense alone suggests that
students cannot learn in an environment that is noisy, distracting, and unsafe").
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structional mandates. For example, classroom space and
laboratory equipment are often lacking. 31

•Inefficient staffing patterns. Some evidence exists to suggest
that urban schools are too large to be effective and that they
are inefficiently staffed with too many people not involved in
teaching. For example, in some cases, 60% of the staff may be
engaged in teaching rather than 80%. 32 Another problematic
pattern is the inefficient management of class size. 33
• Bloated and interfering central bureaucracies and school
boards. Some research and discussion on urban schools finds
that the school district system can be an obstacle to effective
instruction. 34 Reduced school district budgets (other than for
key support services like transportation) and school site
management are plausible responses to this problem.
• Unqualified and burnt-out teachers-dumping grounds.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some urban schools become,
in effect, dumping grounds for teachers who have become
ineffective or problematic in other schools. 35 At least three
mechanisms may be responsible for the "dumping ground"
·phenomenon: (1) principals of experimental schools are given
.unusual authority over personnel selection; (2) the combination of teachers' contractual rights to decline open positions

31.
See William A. Firestone et al., Where Did the $800 Million Go? The First Year
of New Jersey's Quality Education Act, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALYSIS 359,
367 (1994) (reporting that inadequate space was "the most striking problem reported
by the urban low-wealth districts" surveyed).
32.
Valerie E. Lee & Julia B. Smith, Effects ofHigh School Restructuring and Size
on Gains in Achievement and Engagement for Early Secondary School Students, 68 Soc.
EDUC. (forthcoming 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (assessing the impact of attending restructured
secondary schools on students in their early years of high school).
33.
One study found that, although schools in Boston average arithmetically one
teacher for every 17 students, actual classrooms seldom achieved this number. Karen
H. Miles, Finding Time for Improving Schools: A Case Study of Boston Public Schools
1 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University ofMichigan Journal
of Law Reform). Most classes had about 22 students per teacher because there were
very small classes in special education and other subjects. Id. at 3-4. These inefficient,
small classes could be eliminated, such as by consolidating grades, thereby reducing the
student-teacher ratio for regular academic subjects.
34.
See G. Alfred Hess, Jr., Adequacy Rather Than Equity: A New Solution or a
Stalking Horse?, 8 EDUC. POL'V 544, 561-65 (1994) (discussing the interaction of
schools, school districts, and state and federal governments in setting policy).
35. E.g., Darling-Hammond, supra note 25.

664

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:3

in and transfer out of troubled schools and the privilege of
good schools with a surplus of applicants to reject the applications of troubled teachers, resulting in a systematic concentration of troubled teachers in troubled schools; and (3) the
procedural difficulties in dismissing teachers for less than
blatant misconduct.

• Lack of parental involvement. Parental support and coaching are well understood to be important components of acceptable educational achievement and are lacking for many
poor, urban school children. 36
• Lack of social and medical services. Because hungry school
children with toothaches and in need of eyeglasses make less
effective students,37 adequate social services can make a real
difference in educational achievement. 38
•Lack ofincentives to emphasize student performance. Schools
and teachers generally lack incentives to use their time and
resources in ways that maximize student achievement. Rather
than undertake the difficult and uncertain task of accelerated
instruction, many schools go through standard teaching
routines and use their budgets in traditional categories. 39

36.
See MARGARET c. wANG ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. ON EDUC. IN THE INNER CITIES,
SCHOOL LINKED SERVICES: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 23-25 (analyzing parental involvement programs); Madden, Success for All, supra note 20, at 596 (describing the
importance of parental involvement in the Success for All program); David Sullivan,
The Robert M. LaFollette Institute of Public Affairs, An Understanding of What Is
Possible: A Guide to Collaboration and the Coordination of Services in Schools 11 (Aug.
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
37.
For a description of the conditions in some of the nation's poorest schools, see
generally KOZOL, supra note 4, which describes the state of public education in some
urban and impoverished school districts in the United States). See also JONATHAN
KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967) (describing the author's experience as a teacher
in Boston in the mid-sixties).
38.
See generally Edward F. Zigler & Matia Finn-Stevenson, Schools' Role in the
Provision of Support Services for Children and Families: A Critical Aspect of Program
Equity, 8 EDUC. POL'v 591 (1994) (discussing the importance of support services in
achieving educational equality); WANG ET AL., supra note 36, at 1-31 (suggesting
services should be school based); Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1-35 (suggesting
schooVcommunity partnerships in providing services).
39.
See Richard F. Elmore, Thoughts on Program Equity: Productivity and
Incentives for Performance in Education, 8 EDUC. POL'v 453, 455-57 (1994).
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III. THE BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF A
COMPREHENSIVE REMEDY

Keeping in mind the problems facing high-poverty schools,
there are certain important elements of a comprehensive courtordered adequacy remedy for high-poverty schools. Several
points, however, should be emphasized at the outset. First,
while courts might well be required to initiate such a remedy
on behalf of underrepresented poor children, the remedy itself
would have to be designed legislatively at both state and local
levels. In that sense, the judicial remedy is really comprehensive, legislative reform with judicial stimulus. 40 Second, the
remedy should include inquiry procedures and research necessary to design parts of the remedy or modify them as time
progresses. Third, while the recommendations are hopefully
well-considered, they are also tentative and suggestive, offered
as much to guide analysis as to suggest final action. In addition
to the need for ongoing analysis, remedies must conform to local
needs and to the existing policy environment.

A. A Set of Independent Studies and
Structural Design Efforts

The core issues of an effective remedy are instructional
resources and accountability, including governance. This Part
briefly recommends inquiry processes for several issues that
require specifically tailored fact-finding or institutional development and thus resist generic policies.

•Physical facilities and instructional materials. In states that
are undergoing court-ordered school finance reform, funds
intended for instructional improvement have been diverted to
repair dilapidated facilities or to build new classroom space
· needed for state-mandated classes. 41 The only rational way
to address this problem is to conduct an audit of capital
needs, to build adequate facilities, and to provide for a fair
40.
Such was the case in Kentucky. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 605-13.
41.
See, e.g., Firestone et al., supra note 31, at 367 (finding that low-wealth New
Jersey school districts used funds earmarked for curriculum improvement to rebuild
school facilities).
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apportionment of the costs between state and local sources.
There also should be an audit of instructional materials,
because anecdotal evidence suggests that many poor, urban
schools do not provide students with books and other materials to use outside of school. 42

• Study of student mobility and new attendance policies. The
problem of student mobility requires action at the school,
district, and state levels. Schools and districts need to adopt
intelligent and firm attendance policies. Districts may need
to change attendance rules and provide transportation to
maximize the likelihood of continuous instruction. Again, both
the state and the local district should share these expenses.
The district is in the best location to build a "tracking'' system that is capable of identifying intra-district attendance
patterns and assessing the effectiveness of various policies. 43
• Teacher mobility. To address the problem of teacher mobility, states should begin experimenting with salary bonuses
and other policies for increasing the number of qualified
applicants per position and reducing turnover during the first
five years of teaching. States may also need to consider reform of the personnel system by, for example, delegating
hiring to the school level, removing unproductive personnel
restrictions, and helping schools develop more effective personnel policies. 44
• Continued development of school-linked social services. The,
development of social services for poor children is a longrange project with its own logic and timetable. For example,
funding comes from multiple sources and varies significantly
by state, district, and school. 45 Thus, a rational approach to

42.
See KOZOL, supra note 4, at 24, 28-29, 34, 49, 52-53, 63, 86-87, 131, 138-39,
157-58.
43.
While districts may be overly bureaucratic and intrusive with respect to the
core of the educational process, they, or some regional authority, may by necessary to
deal with problems that are beyond the control of individual schools.
44.
See generally RICHARD J. MURNANE ET AL., WHO WILL TEACH? POLICIES THAT
MATTER (1991) (summarizing hiring practices, attrition rates, and the characteristics
of prospective teachers and teachers who leave and later return to teaching, concluding
with recommendations for licensing requirements and teaching incentives).
45.
Michael W. Kirst, Equity for Children: Linking Education and Children's
Services, 8 EDUC. POL'y 583, 587-88 (1994).
.
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this very important policy would ensure that the planning
proceeds as expeditiously as possible. 46

• Changes in school size. A final area needing special study
is how best to create schools of a manageable size not larger
than 500 students. There exist various ways to accomplish
this goal-through schools within schools, or in conjunction
with a building program. Timetables and logistics will also
vary, adding to the importance of a planning process.
B. Additional Instructional Resources and
Accountability Mechanisms
This Part considers the core of the remedy for high-poverty
schools: additional funds for accelerated instruction and mechanisms for encouraging efficient use of resources, that is, guarantees that the extra resources are, in fact, used for accelerated
instruction.
1. Calculating the Amount of Compensatory Aid-The
accepted method for calculating compensatory aid involves
establishing the cost of the educational services necessary to
reach defined educational outcomes. 47 The challenges of making
the calculation in an adequacy context are great, though perhaps similar to other contexts, such as special and bilingual
education. First, the minimum standard can be defined in
different ways-for example, as all children reaching the minimum or as the average child reaching the state average or
grade level. There are quite frequently a few children, overlapping with students in special education programs, who would
require an exorbitant amount of resources to reach minimum
achievement. Second, there are many potential categories of
spending or types of services which have a plausible connection
to higher achievement: safety, physical plant (e.g., heated
classrooms), extra staff (e.g., tutors), extended instruction
(e.g., preschool, summer school), staff for program management,
professional development (e.g., training of teachers in

46.
See Madden, Success for All, supra note 20, at 599; Zigler & Finn-Stevenson,
supra note 38, at 600--04; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1-4 (suggesting collaboration as
the means to encourage these plans).
47.
See Richard A Rossmiller, Equity or Adequacy of School Funding, 8 EDUC.
POL 'y 616, 618 (1994).
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accelerative teaching methods), higher salaries to hire and
maintain qualified teachers, school-linked social services,48 and
bonuses to schools for outstanding performance. 49 Finally,
schools differ in the efficiency with which they transform inputs
into outcomes, so that different schools may require different
amounts of money, and most schools could reach higher
outcomes on existing resources. Finally, most high-poverty
schools already receive some compensatory aid. Chapter 1 funds
are distributed by the federal government to states and thence
to local educational agencies according to the number of poor
and low-achieving students in the school districts under those
agencies. 50 Available monies are widely distributed because of
a very low threshold of eligibility. 51 The basic grant is about
$1000 per pupil. A smaller amount of additional funds is
distributed to localities with a concentration of eligible students, but even this threshold is below the national average,
resulting in wide geographic coverage and low per-pupil
amounts. Local education authorities have discretion about how
to allocate funds across schools but presumably would include
or favor high-poverty schools. Most funds go to elementary
schools because of the perceived importance of preventing early
educational deficits. 52 In 1987-1988, for example, seventy-one
percent of the students served by Chapter 1 attended elementary school. 53 But, according to one study of a sample of schools,
per-pupil expenditures funded by Chapter 1 were lowest in
high-poverty schools located in low-revenue districts, "precisely
the schools one would expect to have the greatest need." 54
It was recommended in Part III.A of this Article that studies
be undertaken to establish the approach to spending in certain
See Clune, supra note 14, at 387-88.
See generally Craig E. Richards et al., Cooperative Performance Incentives in
Education, in REFoRMING EDUCATION: THE EMERGING SYsTEMic .APPROACH 28 (Stephen L.
48.
49.

Jacobson & Robert Berne eds., 1993) (discussing the use of cooperative performance
incentives in education).
50.
Chapter 1 funds are provided by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51.
Chapter 1 only requires that there be at least ten children eligible for funding
in a district. See 20 U.S.C. § 2711(b), (c).
52.
See Wayne C. Riddle, Federal Aid for the Education ofDisadvantaged Children:
Funding, Participation and Legislative Trends, in HELPING AT-RISK STUDENTS: WHAT ARE
THE EDUCATIONAL AND FINANCIAL COSTS 12, 19-20 (Patricia Anthony & Stephen L.
Jacobson eds., 1992).
53.
Id. at 18.
54.
JAY CHAMBERS ET AL., AMERICAN INST. FOR RESEARCH, TRANSLATING DOLLARS
INTo SERVICES: CHAPTER 1 RESOURCES IN THE CONTEXT OF STATE AND LoCAL RESOURCES
FOR EDUCATION at xv (1993).
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categories, such as capital needs and teacher salaries. Some
allowance also must be made for inquiry and proof in each
lawsuit as to state standards and local needs. Despite these
challenges, a tentative approach and even a typical dollar
amount is emerging. First, raising the average achievement in
high-poverty schools to the state average or to grade level
seems a reasonable goal that satisfies the criterion of distributional equity in that no groups would be systematically
disadvantaged. 55 Certainly this result would be a significant
achievement for practically all high-poverty schools. Second, as
for the amount which should be spent, given the complexity of
the variables affecting outcomes, there is no substitute for a
pragmatic approach that would determine a best estimate of the
funds needed, to some extent influenced by the constrained
financial conditions of most states. Well-financed accelerated
schools spend about $2000 per pupil on accelerated instruction,
including extra staff, program management, outreach, preschool
and professional development. 56 In theory, the amount of new
aid required would be reduced by existing compensatory aid,
including federal, or Chapter 1, and state aid. Finally, any costs
associated with a new system of accountability and governance
should not be deducted from compensatory aid to schools intended for instruction but rather should be added to the budgets of state and local government.
Such recommendations seem acceptable as a place to begin.
Once a state starts a program of accelerated education for highpoverty schools, data can be collected on the conditions of
success. For this reason, it may be advisable to fund groups of
schools at various levels above and below the best estimate to
provide a natural experiment.
2. How to Structure the Rest of the Formula-Compensatory
aid is only one aspect of funding public education, and its
effectiveness depends on the structure of the entire system of
school finance. First, there is the old problem of the variable

55.
Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Justice in Education, in SPHERES OF
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, 1990 YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN EDUCATION FINANCE
AsSOCIATION 129-45 (D. Verstegen & J. Ward eds., 1991). Determining how long to
maintain compensatory spending if achievement does not rise to the standard established is one of the problems considered in the desegregation case of Missouri v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2045-46 (1995).
56.
Clune, supra note 14, at 388; William H. Clune, Adequate and Efficient-The
Role of Research, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM
IN EDUCATION (Helen Ladd ed., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 4, on file with the
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base, addressed in federal law through comparability and
supplementation requirements of Chapter 1. 57 If base spending
varies widely among districts, compensatory aid will result in
widely different amounts of total revenue available. Some
variation can be allowed to recognize variable costs, efficiencies,
and allowable differences in local educational goals, but the
basic point remains-that compensatory aid must be added to
an equal base in order to buy the same extra services for all
schools. Second, new funds for public education are severely
constrained in most states. 58 The overall formula must be
designed intelligently so as not to "break the bank," with
enough left over after meeting other needs to fund the compensatory portion. Third, the politics of school finance makes it
imperative to build and maintain a strong political coalition
behind school reform that can continue to seek to satisfy other
principles of justice and standards of minimum adequacy. 59
This approach to the structure of school finance formulas,
which is emerging in research and state policy making, meets
various needs, offers something for a broad coalition of interests, and stays within reasonable revenue limits. 6°First, a moderately high foundation program serves as a base-minimum
spending at a fixed local tax rate with the difference made up
in state aid. The minimum spending level is indexed to a high
spending rural district, perhaps the ninetieth percentile of rural

57. See 20 U.S.C. § 2728(b), (c) (1988); see also MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION
POLICY AND THE LAw 703 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that Congress enacted fiscal requirements to ensure that school districts would spend Chapter 1 funding as intended).
58. See STEVEN D. GoLD, THE OUTLOOK FOR SCHOOL REVENUE IN THE NEXT FIVE
YEARS at v, 5, 7 (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ. Research Report Series No.
34, 1995).
59.
The Grossman Article in this Symposium provides an excellent description of
· the relationship between politics and litigation in Oklahoma. See Mark S. Grossman,
Oklahoma School Finance Litigation: Shifting from Equity to Adequacy, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 521, 548-51, 553-56 (1995).
60.
See generally William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by
Rodriguez: Ending the Separation ofSchool Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging
the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN_. L. REV. 721 (1992) (presenting a threepart plan for improving the effectiveness of public education); Allan Odden et al., The
Intricacies of Reforming School Finance: Providing Property Tax Relief Through the
School Finance System (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey limited its remedy to the urban districts "with special educational needs," and thus did not
require a new system of aid for the entire state. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408-09
(N.J. 1990). The amount of aid ordered by the court for the special needs districts,
however, approximated what would be available in a statewide system like the one
recommended here, in effect creating a high foundation plus compensatory aid. See id.
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spending. 61 This level of spending has the advantage of not
forcing rural districts to spend more than they wish, thus
saving money and avoiding political resistance. The "rural
ninetieth" probably also corresponds to what independent study
would establish as a minimally adequate, low-cost program for
the state. If the required local tax rate is set properly, taxpayers in many poor districts will receive substantial local property
tax relief, because many poor districts already exceed what is
likely to be the required minimum. 62 The benefit comes from
the state aid awarded for the minimum local rate. Thus, one
important group-taxpayers in poor districts-is given some
relief, while spending rises in a few low-wealth, low-taxing districts.63
A second tier of guaranteed tax base (GTB), 64 or power equalization, is added primarily to cover the generally higher average
costs of suburban and urban districts, but the GTB is also
available to the rural districts. 65 A GTB allows these districts
to estimate their own costs by choosing a tax rate above the
minimum in the foundation program, with the GTB compensating for the wealth of districts. But costs of a GTB can be large
because of the stimulative effect of high matching grants in the
lower wealth districts. To counter these costs, the program is
constrained by. setting the guaranteed tax base at a high but
not unreasonable level, for example, the ninetieth percentile of
wealth, and by setting a maximum spending level supportable
by state aid, again set at about the ninetieth percentile of
statewide spending. This part of the formula gives something
to poorer urban and suburban districts in the coalition, avoids
excessive costs, and provides a high base for compensatory aid.
The assumption is that cities containing high-poverty schools
will correctly estimate their general costs by setting a reasonably high local tax rate.

61.
See Allan R. Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Formulas: Aging
Structures in Need of Renovation 5, 18-19 (June 26, 1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
62.
See ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE 200 (1992).
63.
See id.
64.
Under power equalization, an equal tax rate always yields the same spending
throughout the state. The hypothetical tax base that would produce such spending at
the defined rates iS called the guaranteed tax base or GTB. When the local tax rate
produces Jess than the guarantee, the difference is made up from state aid.
65.
See ODDEN & Picus, supra note 62, at 182-92.
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Finally, the adequacy standard does not require limiting
spending in the wealthiest districts through spending caps or
recapture of local revenues for other districts. Lower spending
in wealthy districts does not help the students in other districts; rather, it may harm them by removing a standard for
excellence and intensifying political resistance. 66
3. Combining Dollars, Inputs, Programs, and Incentives:
Solving the Dilemmas of Loose Coupling-We now reach the
problem of how to guarantee adequate outcomes from the
additional spending. The first question is whether the remedy
should require specific inputs, such as pupil to teacher ratios,
certified teachers, and research-based educational programs; or
whether high-poverty schools should have discretion in how to
spend the categorical aid. This question is particularly important because input standards have been used in proof of the
violation, as in the Alabama case,67 and it is only natural to ask
whether the remedy should consist of simply filling the gap
between the standards and the actual practice.
Our best knowledge on this question suggests that while
inputs can be used to monitor quality, diagnose potential
problems, and set a vision of effective education, they should
not be used as regulatory standards. 68 The reason is our uncertainty about the relationship between educational practices and
outcomes or, in the language of production functions, the indeterminate mix of raw inputs that will produce good outcomes
for specific teachers and students. 69 Specified inputs and levels
of inputs are a best guess about effective average practice but
may not be the best answer in a particular context. Thus,
schools should be given considerable flexibility in how they
spend resources and should be held accountable only for results.
If the results are not good, then deviations from standard

66.
See Clune, supra note 60, at 739-40 (arguing against recapture of local tax
revenues and spending caps for wealthy districts).
67.
Morgan et al., supra note 7, at 564-81, 587-92.
68.
See Andrew C. Porter, National Equity and School Autonomy, 8 EDUC. POLY
489, 490 (1994); Andrew C. Porter, The Uses and Misuses of Opportunity-to-Learn
Standards, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 27 [hereinafter Porter, Standards];
see also Lorraine M. McDonnell, Opportunity To Learn As a Research Concept and a
Policy Instrument, 17 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY ANALYSIS 305, 317-18 (1995)
(concluding that "opportunity-to-learn" standards as a policy will remain primarily
hortatory because of their political history and technical limitations).
69.
See David H. Monk, Policy Challenges Surrounding the Shift Toward OutcomeOriented School Finance Equity Standards, 8 EDUC. POLY 471, 473, 481 (1994).
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practice may be used to explain why and to suggest possible
avenues for improvement.
In this framework, the role of input standards in the violation
stage is to establish a plausible link between low spending and
low outcomes by demonstrating the absence among poor schools
of typically effective practice. The ultimate remedy, however,
should not tie the schools to typical practice and, indeed, should
encourage more freedom than is allowed under certification
standards. 70 Of course, equitable remedies have traditionally
been flexible and discretionary, 71 and some tension between a
standard-oriented violation phase and a flexible remedial phase
is to be expected in public law litigation.
The one set of inputs which must be imposed from the outside
is embedded in the basic theory of accountability for outcomes.
When a state establishes the knowledge and skills for which
schools are accountable through testing or other indicators, it
also imposes, implicitly or explicitly, a curriculum of subject
areas and specific skills within the subject matters. 72 Public
authorization of the objectives of education is so fundamental
to the state role that the Kentucky Supreme Court ordered the
legislature to develop a statewide curriculum and student assessment as part of the constitutional requirement of a true
"system" of public schools. 73 The danger of becoming too prescriptive about educational outcomes has prompted advocates
of systemic reform to urge curriculum "frameworks" rather than
detailed regulation of curriculum. 74 Yet the risk of detailed

70.
The Morgan et al. Article in this Symposium describes the detailed focus on
inputs and input standards which characterized the violation stage of the Alabama
litigation, but also refers to an ongoing remedial pha5e which considers a wide range
of flexible remedies. Morgan et al., supra note 7, at 594-98. See also Robert E. Slavin,
Statewide Finance Reform: Ensuring Educational Adequacy for High-Poverty Schools,
8 EDUC. POL'y 425, 430-33 (1994) (listing seven kinds of programs with strong research
bases for states to consider).
71.
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1292-1302 (1976).
72.
Cf Porter, Standards, supra note 68, at 22 (discussing the ways in which
schools might be held accountable for meeting certain standards).
73.
See Rose v: Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).
Note that a state or school district could authorize standards by approving those of
. intermediate agencies such as school improvement networks. See William H. Clune, The
Best Path to Systemic Educational Policy: Standard/Centralized or Differentiated/ Decentralized?, 15 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALYSIS 233, 245 (1993). Networks
also might serve as the agent for accountability in bilateral contracts discussed infra
Part 111.C.

74.
See, e.g., Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O'Day, Systemic School Reform, in THE
POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING: THE 1990 YEARBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF
EDUCATION AsSOCIATION 233, 249 (Susan H. Fuhrman & Betty Malen eds., 1991).
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control is always present, sometimes in paradoxical ways.
Portfolio assessment of student performance, for example, may
be liberating for the student relative to standardized tests, but
may go far toward regulating educational practice. For example,
if students are to be assessed through written work they do for
regular classes, then teachers may conform their practices to
produce such papers. 75

C. What Kind of Governance? Solving the Problems of
Knowledge, Productivity, and Political Support
The next question is what system of governance is best suited
to measuring outcomes while otherwise leaving maximum
discretion at the school level? Four broad options76 are available:
(1) local control or laissez-faire, (2) state reform, (3) bilateral
contracts with schools, and (4) family choice or educational
vouchers. This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of each, concluding that some form of technically assisted
bilateral contract, such as chartering, is the most realistic option
for achieving substantial improvements in outcomes among
high-poverty schools.
Local control, or laissez-faire, is the historic system of educational governance in the United States. 77 It is also the reason
why the United States is so unusual in the world context. 78
Educational reforms are gradually eroding this aspect of the
system. 79 The advantage oflocal control, is allowance for maximum flexibility at the school level for defining and implement-

75.
See Porter, Standards, supra note 68, at 23. The Trimble and Forsaith Article
in this Symposium contains several good discussions of the pressure exerted on practice
by the Kentucky student assessment. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 616,
618-22, 626-30.
76.
These options can be combined in various ways.
77. See David K Cohen, Governance and Instruction: The Promise of Decentralization and Choice, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY
OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION 337, 337-38 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte
eds., 1990); cf John F. Witte, Choice and Control: An Analytical Overview, in 1 CHOICE
AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN
EDUCATION 11, 30-31 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) (arguing that
proponents of decentralization are incorrect to characterize American education as a
uniform, hierarchically and centrally controlled system).
78.
David K Cohen & James P. Spillane, Policy and Practice: The Relations
Between Governance and Instruction, 18 REV. RESEARCH EDUC. 3, 6-7 (1992).
79.
See id. at 7-8.
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ing appropriate objectives. Research suggests, for example, the
importance in accountability systems of measuring a wide range
of student performance and giving teachers broad flexibility in
meeting the widely varying learning needs of individual students.80 But complete local control has fallen into. disfavor
because it has not produced high minimum outcomes, 81 and it
seems to lack the external pressure to change that is needed to
offset bureaucratic inertia. At least three main biases or flaws
of educational organization have been accepted as requiring
some system of external accountability-a lack of outcome
focus, multiple and conflicting goals, and a lack of incentive for
efficient use of resources. 82
State reform is the most common emerging alternative to
local control. 83 The great advantage of state reform is the hope
for some degree of coherence in educational policy, giving
schools authoritative guidance about what is expected of them
and providing powerful statewide incentives for performance,
such as high-stakes student examinations. A vigorous debate is
emerging in the United States about advantages and disadvantages of central control, as well as dispute over exactly what
this concept means. 84
However, central control clearly must be supplemented and
adapted for success ip. high-poverty schools because of a lack of
performance standards and structured technical assistance.
Even avant-garde state reforms such as Kentucky's emphasize
content standards85 and general standards of performance over

80.
See Linda Darling-Hammond, Creating Standards of Practice and Delivery for
Learner-Centered Schools, 4 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 37, 47-48 (1992-1993).
81.
See generally Hanushek, supra note 10, at 423-56 (discussing various misconceptions and problems surrounding school finance reform efforts).
82.
For a related discussion, see William H. Clune, The Cost and Management of
Program Adequacy: An Emerging Issue in Educational Policy and Finance, 8 EDUC.
POL'y 365, 368--69 (1994) (summarizing the work of several scholars on the adequacy
of educational policy and finance).
83.
For example, sophisticated recommendations from the Legislative Research
Commission served as the architecture for the ambitious system of reforms in Kentucky. See Memorandum from David W. Hornbeck to Chairmen David K Karem and
Jody Richards and Members of the Curriculum Committee of Kentucky (Feb. 15, 1990)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
84.
See generally Clune, supra note 73, at 233 (evaluating the problems and
implications of systemic educational policy and concluding that such a policy is "fatally
flawed"); Charles L. Thompson et al., The State Policy System Affecting Science and
Mathematics Education in Michigan (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (comparing two approaches to
systemic reform as they would relate to teaching mathematics in Michigan).
85.
Content standards are those that define the knowledge and skills every student
is to learn.
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performance standards86 for particular groups of students. The
common approach to performance standards in statewide
reform is "value added," an approach that expects schools to
show improved scores annually. 87 To be sure, yearly gains
would be welcome in high-poverty schools, and they are the
focus of recent reforms in federal Chapter 1 aid for disadvantaged students and high-poverty schools. 88 But modest gains fail
to express the idea of high minimum outcomes which is central
to the theory of adequacy, and value-added reform may be a
prescription for never escaping embedded patterns of educational failure. State reform also fails to offer high-poverty
schools the kind of focused technical assistance and professional
development that would be congruent with many higher performance goals, such as programs for rapid acceleration of outcomes.
A system of family choice, or vouchers, has much to recommend and probably should be part of the reform of high-poverty
schools in some way. One advantage is a fundamental aspect of
accountability through which parents can show their displeasure by simply abandoning bad schools, rather than appealing
to a cumbersome and indifferent bureaucracy. When schools fail
to show adequate progress in Kentucky, for example, family
choice is one of the remedies which is automatically invoked. 89
Choice systems also may encourage the formation of motivated
educational communities over time and encourage healthy
competition in the whole system. 90 One cannot, however, begin
with choice as a universal remedy as it poses several grave
dangers. Choice schools have no obvious incentive to adopt
accelerated education. 91 Choice systems also pose a problem on

86.
Performance standards establish levels of knowledge and skill to be attained
by different groups of students at different times.
87.
See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 640-41, 645.
88.
See COMMISSION ON CHAPrER 1, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR CHILDREN IN PoVERTY
29-31 (1992).
89.
Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 649-50.
90.
See JAMES s. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PuBLIC AND PRlvATE HIGH ScHooI.S:
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES 221-33 (1987) (discussing the "human capital" and

"social capital" provided to students by supportive and educated families and
communities).
91.
See William H. Clune, Educational Governance and Student Achievement, in
2 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE PRACTICE OF CHOICE, DECENTRALIZATION AND ScHOOL RESTRUCTURING 391, 409-10 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte
eds., 1990); William H. Clune, Educational Policy in a Situation of Uncertainty; Or,
How to Put Eggs in Different Baskets, in THE POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING: THE
1990 YEARBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION AssocIATION 125, 133 (Susan H. Fuhrman
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the supply side. An adequate supply of private schools takes a
long time to develop, especially if parochial schools are excluded. Furthermore, poorly designed choice systems could
severely harm poor children, unless courts were as willing to
strike down inadequate voucher schools as inadequate state-run
schools. 92 In sum, voucher schools should not be starved of
resources, should be subject to the same standards of minimum
student achievement, and should not be exempt from performance sanctions-both rewards and punishments.
Thus, at least in the short term, the most promising way to
institutionalize high expectations, technical assistance, and
local flexibility for high-poverty schools is to institute some
variation of bilateral contracting. 93 An agency of government
must reach an agreement with each school about the high
outcomes which the school would target and the means necessary to reach these outcomes. The government unit can be the
state, the district, or an independent professional agency, and
there may be standard agreements. Research on accelerated
education shows quite clearly that the key component and
critical first phase of restructuring is obtaining the consent of
the local staff about the ends and means of accelerated education.94 This agreement may then serve as the blueprint for
monitoring outcomes, technical assistance, and accountability
through the use of group bonuses and graduated sanctions.
Many aspects of this kind of bilateral contracting remain to
be developed and refined. For example, the agency involved
with accountability should also offer technical assistance. 95 Also,
& Betty Malen eds., 1991). For an analysis of a particular choice system, see JOHN
F. WI'ITE ET AL., FOURTH-YEAR REPORT MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM (1994).
92.
See Carnoy, supra note 12, at 52.
93.
See Clune, supra note 14, at 380 (noting the contractual nature of the "true
adequacy" approach); Linda Darling-Hammond, Standards of Practice for LearnerCentered Schools, in OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 191, 197-98 (Robert Berne &
Lawrence 0. Picus eds., 1994) (listing ways to make schools more accountable and
noting that school districts also must pledge themselves to certain standards); Henry
M. Levin, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Achieving Educational Equity,
in OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 167, 181 (Robert Berne & Lawrence 0. Picus eds.,
1994) (suggesting that quality education of at-risk students requires a unity of purpose
among those who respectively plan, implement, and evaluate educational programs).
94.
For example, the "Success for All" schools, developed by Robert Slavin, require
that 80% of the school's staff agree to participate in the program. RoBERT E. SLAVIN ET
AL. , SUCC&<!S FOR ALL: A RELEmlEss Al'PRoAcH TO PREvENTION AND EARLY INIBRvENTION IN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 42 (1992). Levin's "accelerated schools" also require the involvement of the school's staff in designing curriculum and strategies. Levin, Accelerated
Schools, supra note 13, at 21; Barnett, supra note 22, at 5-6, 7.
95.
The Kentucky system does so at the state level. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra
note 6, at 632-37.
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while withdrawal of compensatory aid could be used justifiably
as an ultimate sanction, the agency should have authority for
some system of graduated sanctions and intensified technical
assistance if schools in difficulty are to be improved rather than
simply punished. 96
Despite its appeal, bilateral contracting has plenty of disadvantages. The contracts themselves could become empty
exercises of paperwork or emphasize process and planning
rather than substance. Such was the fate of a similar system in
a previous phase of the New Jersey litigation. 97 The governance
system also could be bureaucratically unwieldy and beyond the
technical capacity of our political system. The strains placed by
reforms on state education agencies are a sobering example of
this danger. 98 Nevertheless, the fundamental structural advantages are great. Even a simple system could succeed in giving
high-poverty schools three things we have never given them
before: clear expectations about level of performance, technical
assistance about how to make improvements, and meaningful
rewards for success.
Bilateral contracting also is not as strange and novel as it
sounds. All over the country, school districts are resorting to
varieties of contracting for improved performance: charter
schools, regulated vouchers, privatization, and so forth. 99 Under

96.
The Kentucky reforms offer a promising first approximation of such graduated
responses at the state level. See id. at 649-50.
97. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 392 (N.J. 1990) (finding that the system
designed "to measure and achieve a thorough and efficient" educational system had
failed to meet its goal); see generally William A. Firestone & Brianna Nagle, Differential
Regulation: Clever Customization or Unequal Interference (July 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform) (describing
the regulatory oversight system for "special needs districts" in New Jersey and how that
system created "additional paperwork burdens").
98.
See, e.g., Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman, Governing Curriculum:
Changing Patterns in Policy, Politics, and Practice, in THE GoVERNANCE OF CURRICULUM: 1994 YEARBOOK OF THE AsSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 1, 8 (Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994) (describing the
knowledge, resource, and political barriers that policymakers and administrators face
in implementing reform); Susan F. Lusi, Systemic School Reform: The Challenges Faced
by State Departments of Education, in THE GoVERNANCE OF CURRICULUM: 1994
YEARBOOK OF THE AsSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 109,
127 (Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994) ("Systemic school reform
requires much deeper reforms than bureaucracies typically allow.").
99.
See generally CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (William H.
Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) (analyzing both the theory and the practice of school
choice and decentralization); Priscilla Wohlstetter, Education by Charter, in SCHOOLBASED MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 139 (Susan A. Mohrman
et al. eds., 1994) (comparing charter-school legislation in several states and in England).
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considerable pressure from various sources, political authorities
appear to be discovering the comparative advantages of this
form of governance. 100 The coming period should be an interesting one in American educational history and a time for learning
how to model new governance arrangements on successful
experiments.

IV. CONCLUSION: SUCCESS IS EVEN BETTER
THAN ACCOUNTABILITY

If we are gradually entering a period of educational policy
characterized by compensatory aid for high-poverty schools and
new kinds of educational governance, there are at least two
great risks in the whole experiment: political skepticism and
"getting to scale." Political skepticism about increased educational spending is rampant throughout society and even more
so when the recipients are poor children who are racial or
ethnic minorities. For instance, the long history of the New
Jersey litigation is, among other things, a case study in a court
battling negative political trends in suburbs and rural areas
that oppose redistribution of wealth to poor cities. 101 A related
problem is that of "getting to scale"-where good ideas about
teaching practice and school organization seldom move to most
schools when they are demonstrated to be effective in a few. 102
Most efforts to improve urban schools, like most efforts to
implement any social policy, encounter various degrees of
acceptance and resistance from different communities. 103 For
100. See TED KOLDERIE, PuBLIC SERVICES REDESIGN PROJECT, CTR. FOR POLICY
STUDIES, THE CHARTER IDEA: PROGRESS IN '94; A BATTLE COMING IN '93 at 2 (n.d.);
Kathleen Sylvester, Setting Schools Free: The Charter School Movement in Public
Education, NETWORK NEWS & VIEWS, Oct. 1994, at 95, 95. See generally MARC D.
MILLOT, PROGRAM FOR RE-INVENTING PuBLIC EDUCATION, INST. FOR PuB. POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT & RAND, WHAT ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS?: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONCEPT AND THE STATUTES (n.d.) (describing the charter school concept).
101. See Firestone et al., supra note 31, at 360 (discussing the public's resistance
to school finance reform); Goertz, supra note 8, at 363 (discussing Republican resistance
to increased funding for urban schools).
102. Richard F. Elmore, Getting to Scale With Successful Educational Practices 2-3
(Nov. 22, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Mi~higan

Journal of Law Reform).
103. See, e.g., Henry M. Levin, Little Things Mean a Lot, 8 EDUC. POL'y 396 (1994)
(both endorsing and criticizing my adequacy model for school finance reform); Hess,

supra note 34, at 544-67 (raising concerns about my adequacy theory from the point
of view of a practitioner).

680

University of Michigan Journal of Law &form

[VOL. 28:3

example, a small group of "connoisseur" schools may adopt
reforms enthusiastically and skillfully; a middle group of
schools may be slower but eventually may show substantial
improvement; a final group, perhaps thirty percent, may be
highly resistant to change, perhaps for reasons which remain
elusive even under close inspection. 104 The two problems can
converge in a social planner's nightmare when a large, poorly
designed and financed program encounters strong resistance to
implementation and social impatience with cost and lack of
results.
I believe that the cure to these daunting problems is to build
a program which emphasizes success over accountability.
Success can be maximized by going slowly to scale rather than
implementing the whole system all at once. Improvement
efforts should focus first on the early grades, for example,
grades one to three, because the youngest children have not yet
fallen disastrously behind in their progress. Schools should be
admitted to contracting status gradually to provide examples of
success before any significant increases in taxes and to provide
lessons from early successes and failures.
While the challenges are great, so is the promise. The two
earlier experiments in vertical equity, special education and
bilingual education, have serious problems, but are also accepted as at least partial success stories. How can deaf children and
children who do not speak English make adequate progress
without special attention to their communicative problems? At
the most fundamental level, the concept of adequacy in school
finance is extremely simple: it recognizes the special needs of
a new group of students, those in high-poverty schools. Adequacy theory sets appropriate, high expectations of performance,
and it delivers the resources and governance necessary to reach
those goals.

104. For a description of the results of one Chicago program, see Hess, supra note
34, at 557-58 (finding that one-third of the schools studied engaged in significant
reform, one-third in unfocused changes, and one-third in few changes). See also Levin,
supra note 103, at 400 (estimating that, in one program, half of the schools "take off
immediately," one-third take more time, and 15% face serious obstacles).

